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Peacocke’s Principle-Based Account of Modality:  Flexibility of 
Origins plus S4. 
 
 
Introduction 
Flexibility of origins for artefacts is a thesis that holds that artefacts allow for slight variations 
in their origins. Due to the influence of Nathan Salmon’s views, endorsement of this thesis is 
often thought to carry a commitment to the denial of S4. This paper rejects the existence of 
this commitment and examines how Peacocke’s theory of the modal may accommodate 
flexibility of origins without denying S4.  
One of the essential features of Peacocke’s account is the identification of the Principles of 
Possibility, which determine the set of possible worlds. These principles divide into a set of 
first-order principles, and a single second-order principle. In turn, the first-order principles 
divide into the Modal Extension Principles (MEP), and a set of Constitutive Principles. 
Regarding the modal status of the first-order principles, the account is explicitly committed to 
the necessity of MEP, but leaves open the possibility that some of the Constitutive Principles 
be only contingently true, adding that there is nothing in the account that guarantees their 
necessity. The contingency of the Constitutive Principles would amount, as we will see, to the 
denial of S4, and Peacocke’s considerations for committing himself neither to their necessity, 
nor to S4, allude precisely to Salmon’s views on the consequences of flexibility of origins. 
More specifically, he seems to share Salmon’s argument from flexibility of origins to the 
denial of S4. 
 
Here, however, I show that, in the way in which the Principle-Based Account is presented in 
Being Known, the Constitutive Principles are necessary; in particular, that their contingency 
is inconsistent with the recursivity of MEP, and that this makes the account validate S4. Also, 
I show that, compatibly with their necessity (and the validation of S4), Peacocke’s account 
still leaves room for accommodating intuitions about flexibility of origins, which makes it a 
case against Salmon’s argument from flexibility to the denial of S4. 
Salmon (1981) argues for the non-transitivity of the accessibility relation among worlds in 
order to solve the Four Worlds Paradox, constructed under the assumption of flexibility of 
origins. In his argument, he assumes that the individuative essences of artefacts change from 
world to world. This (controversial) assumption is consistent in Salmon’s framework, but, as 
we will see, it is not so in Peacocke’s modal approach. On the face of it, I suggest that we 
should in general be more reluctant to Salmon’s way of motivating the non-transitivity of the 
accessibility relation among worlds; specially, because there are alternative ways of solving 
the Four Worlds Paradox which do not require the denial of S4. One such alternative has 
been offered by Williamson (1990). His solution requires no specifically modal 
commitments, and is thereby compatible with transitivity, since it does not deny that artefacts 
keep their individuative essences constant across worlds.  
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The general conclusion of the paper will be that, if Peacocke’s Principle-Based Account is to 
keep the recursivity of MEP, then, to the extent that we want the account to accommodate the 
intuitions about flexibility of origins, we should not do so via Salmon’s treatment (since it 
renders the account inconsistent), but rather via a treatment along the lines of Williamson’s, 
and keeping S4. As we will see, the account we end up with once these intuitions have been 
consistently accommodated may not be satisfactory, and this opens up the debate about 
whether or not artefacts allow for some variations in their material origins. A contribution to 
this debate is, however, beyond the scope of the present paper, which aims only to show that, 
whatever our intuitions are with respect to origin essentialism, Peacocke’s account can 
accommodate them as long as our procedure does not require the contingency of even one of 
the Principles of Possibility. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In §1, I briefly sketch Peacocke’s account paying 
special attention to the parts that are strictly necessary for the discussion, while supplying the 
reader unfamiliar with it sufficient background to be able to follow it. I assume familiarity 
with Salmon’s Paradox (but refer to source pages when appropriate). In §2, I introduce the 
discussion and give my arguments for the claims defended here.  
 
 
1. Peacocke’s Account of Modality. 
 
1.1. The Principles of Possibility. 
The Principles of Possibility play an essential role in answering the question about what 
possible worlds there are. Regarding the metaphysics of modality, one of Peacocke’s aims is 
to “give a substantive account of what is involved in a state of affairs being possible” 
(Peacocke 1999, p. 125). The key notion of this substantive account is that of admissible 
assignment, from which Peacocke identifies the set of possible worlds. Let us first introduce 
the notion of assignment and then focus on the Principles of Possibility, which are conceived 
of as the constraints any assignment must satisfy for it to be admissible.  
 
An assignment, s, is a 4-tuple <Ds, vals, propvals, exts> where: 
– Ds is its associated domain; the range of the quantifiers in s. 
– vals is a function from concepts to extensions. By means of val, an assignment s assigns 
semantic values of the appropriate category to atomic concepts. [In symbols, ‘val(C,s)’] 
 – provals is a function from atomic concepts to properties and relations. The values that 
propval assigns to the elements of its domain must also be of the appropriate category. [In 
symbols, ‘proval(C,s)’] 
– exts is a function from properties and relations to extensions. Also here the restriction 
about the appropriate category applies. [In symbols, ‘ext(P,s)’] 
 
The aforementioned restriction about the appropriate category requires only that the arity of 
concepts and relations be respected: 
(i) For any assignment s, for any function, f, in s, and for any argument, o, in dom(f), the 
arity of o must be the same as the arity of f(o). 
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Apart from (i), a further (and commonsense) restriction is placed upon the notion of 
assignment. It requires coordination between the two different itineraries an assignment 
supplies for going from concepts to extensions; that is, it requires that, given a concept C, its 
semantic value be the same as the extension of its property value: 
(ii)      val(C, s)=f  iff ext(propval(C,s),s)=f 
 
From the notion of assignment, we can define the notion of specification corresponding to s, 
as the set of exactly those Thoughts and propositions (including complex ones) that 
assignment s counts as true. Thus far: 
Assignment: <Ds, vals, provals, exts>.  
Specification-corresponding-to-s: The set of Thoughts and propositions that s 
counts as true 
The Principles of Possibility are constraints for an assignment to be admissible. Before 
sketching these Principles, let us see how Peacocke answers the question of what are possible 
worlds. Two more notions:  
Admissible Assignment: Assignment that satisfies all the Principles of Possibility. 
Possible World: Specification corresponding to an admissible assignment. 
 
Let us now sketch the Principles of Possibility. We start with the Modal Extension Principle, 
whose underlying idea is that any concept is governed by a certain rule, R, whose application 
determines, in each case, its actual extension. These rules are constitutive of concepts, in the 
sense that the rule provides an answer to the question about the identity of the concept [See 
(Peacocke 1999, 153)]. In some cases, the rule for a concept C will state inter-conceptual 
connections that will be definitory of C. By way of illustration, if the rule governing the 
concept bachelor states that its extension is the intersection of the extensions of the concepts 
unmarried and man, then any admissible assignment must assign to bachelor the 
aforementioned intersection. The idea is that this generalizes no matter the kind of concept 
(logical constants, rigid designators, etc.). [See (Peacocke 1999, pp. 128-142)]. Having said 
this, MEP is stated as follows: 
Modal Extension Principle. An assignment s is admissible only if: for any concept C, 
the semantic value of C according to s is the result of applying the same rule as is 
applied in the determination of the actual semantic value of C. (Peacocke 1999, p. 136) 
 
We turn now to the Constitutive Principles. The reason for classifying the (first-order) 
principles into, on the one hand, the Modal Extension Principle, and, on the other, the 
Constitutive Principles, is that the former rules, at the level of concepts, what the latter rule at 
the level of reference. If we take it that the rules governing concepts are constitutive of them, 
we can say that both, the Constitutive Principles and the MEP, require the same sort of thing 
at different levels; namely, that an admissible assignment respects the constitutive relations. 
Peacocke provides a couple of examples of plausible Constitutive Principles. The first one 
here concerns the fundamental kind of an object:  
If P is a property which is an object x’s fundamental kind, then an assignment is 
inadmissible if it counts the proposition x is P as false. (Peacocke 1999, p. 145) 
The next one concerns the necessity of origins for humans. Under the assumption that it is 
constitutive of a person a that she originates in the particular sperm b and egg cell c from 
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which she actually originated, Peacocke proposes the following as a constitutive principle for 
a: 
An assignment is inadmissible if it both counts the proposition a exists as true and 
counts the proposition a develops from b and c as false. (Peacocke 1999, p. 146) 
 
The role of these principles is to ensure that any element belonging to the set of possible 
worlds that Peacocke’s account will finally supply is (in addition to being conceptually 
consistent, something guaranteed by MEP) metaphysically consistent. Also, the constitutive 
principles provide individuative conditions for objects and play, in this account, the role of 
cross-world identification principles. [See (Peacocke 2002b, p. 504)] 
The MEP and the Constitutive Principles are, as we have seen, necessary conditions for an 
assignment to be admissible. A second-order principle is stated to the effect that they are 
jointly sufficient. 
Principle of Constrained Recombination. An assignment is admissible if it respects the 
set of conditions on admissibility given hitherto. (Peacocke 1999, p. 149) 
 
The truth conditions for the necessity and the possibility operators are given in what he calls 
‘The Characterization of Necessity’ and ‘The Characterization of Possibility’; respectively: 
A Thought or proposition is necessary iff it is true according to all admissible 
assignments. 
A Thought or proposition is possible iff it is true according to some admissible 
assignment. (Peacocke 1999, p. 150) 
 
To summarize thus far, assignments divide into admissible and inadmissible. Admissible 
assignments are so in virtue of the satisfaction of all the Principles of Possibility. For any 
admissible assignment, its corresponding specification is a genuine possibility, which 
Peacocke identifies with (his) ersatz worlds. 
 
1.2. The Recursivity of MEP. 
There is a significant feature of the Modal Extension Principle that will be especially relevant 
for the discussion in the next section. The feature is that the Modal Extension Principle is 
self-applicable (it operates recursively). This means that the principle applies to the very 
same concept which it helps to define; namely, admissible. To see why, note that: 
The Modal Extension Principle, when taken together with the other Principles of 
Possibility, fixes a rule for determining the actual extension of the concept admissible. 
The Modal Extension Principle can then be applied to the concept admissible itself. 
(Peacocke 1999, p. 151; my emphasis) 
To illustrate this, consider an admissible assignment s. By s’s admissibility, it satisfies MEP 
and all the Constitutive Principles. By s’s satisfaction of MEP, s determines the extensions of 
all concepts by applying, in each case, the same rule as is applied in the actual world. In 
particular, s determines the extension of admissible according to the rule that determines its 
actual extension; that is, according to both MEP and the Constitutive Principles. We find with 
it the first application of the recursivity of MEP. It ensures that an assignment s is admissible 
only if it counts as admissible those assignments that satisfy MEP and the Constitutive 
Principles.  
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A first consequence of the recursivity of MEP is that it provides us with the relativized 
version of the notion of admissible. Since any assignment will assign its own extension to 
admissible, and since (thanks to the recursivity) we know the rule with which this extension 
is determined, this gives us, for any assignment s, the set of assignments that are admissible 
according to s; i.e., the extension of admissible according to s. 
The most immediate benefit of this recursivity is that iterated modalities become tractable 
under this account (since any admissible assignment will, in turn, assign its own extension to 
admissible assignment).1 To know whether the truth conditions for ‘◊◊p’ obtain, we need to 
know whether there is an admissible assignment, s, such that there is an assignment, s’, such 
that s’∈val(admissible, s), and p ∈ s’-specification. That is, we need to check whether there is 
an admissibly admissible assignment, s’, such that the proposition p belongs to its 
corresponding specification. As Peacocke says, “iteration requires us to consider what is 
admissibly admissible” (Peacocke, 1999: 151), and it would be the recursivity of MEP that, 
by providing us with the relativized version of admissible, allows us to know what is 
admissibly admissible.  
Note that there is implicit in the above quotation a correlation between the binary relation 
(among assignments) x is admissible according to y and the also binary relation (among 
worlds) of x is accessible from y. For any two assignments, s and s’: 
s is admissible according to s’ iff     s-specification is accessible from s’-
specification. 
The recursivity of MEP, thus, helps to establish the accessibility relation among worlds. 
 
 
2. The Modal Status of the Constitutive Principles. 
 
2.1. The Modal Status of the Principles of Possibility. 
Shortly after stating that the Modal Extension Principle is self-applicable, Peacocke notes 
its necessity [See (Peacocke 1999, p. 152)]. By contrast, and alluding to Salmon’s examples 
on the origins of artefacts, he leaves open the question of whether some of the Constitutive 
Principles may be, although true, only contingently so, adding that there is nothing in his 
account that guarantees their necessity. A consequence of this is that S4 would not be 
validated by his account: 
If we ask whether the characteristic principle of S4 will hold in absolute generality, for 
any content or sentence, simply as a result of the principle-based conception itself, then 
the initial answer must be: only if all the Principles of Possibility themselves hold 
under every admissible assignment, and every admissibly admissible assignment, ... 
and so forth. We have seen that the Modal Extension Principle and the Characterisation 
of Necessity do have this property. But as far as I can see, nothing guarantees that all 
                                                 
1  The other benefit of this recursivity is that one can argue for the necessity of the Characterization 
of Necessity. That is, that the Characterization is true under all admissible assignments. [See 
(Peacocke 1999, p.151-152)] 
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the Principles of Possibility which I have put under the label of ‘Constitutive 
Principles’ must have this property. Indeed, there are some theorists who self-
consciously adopt constitutive principles which they also hold to be contingent. 
(Peacocke 1999, p. 195; my emphasis) 
 
Here I will address, and answer in the negative, the following questions:  
(i)  Do Salmon’s examples give decisive support to the contingency of the Constitutive 
Principles? 
(ii) Is their contingency consistent with the principle-based approach, and, more 
specifically, with the recursivity of MEP? 
 
The theoretical interest of question (i) derives from the following. Suppose that we are 
attracted to Peacocke’s Principle-Based Account of the Modal. And suppose further that we 
do not want to renounce S4 so quickly. We will be happy enough if we can prove that the 
answer to (ii) is ‘no’. However, what if we share Salmon’s intuitions about the flexibility of 
origins for artefacts? Can we still accommodate those intuitions within Peacocke’s proposal? 
My claim is that we can, since accommodation of those intuitions does not require the 
contingency of the Constitutive Principles. Thus, transitivity of the accessibility relation 
among worlds, and flexibility of origins for artefacts, are both (and jointly) compatible with 
Peacocke’s account. 
 
2.2. Addressing Question (i). 
It will be shown in this subsection that Salmon’s intuitions on the flexibility of origin do not 
require the contingency of the constitutive principles. From here, the Principle-Based 
Account can accommodate flexibility of origins with the validation of S4. 
 
Consider a particular table, c, and let m be the particular piece of matter from which c 
actually originated. According to Peacocke, and if flexibility of origins holds, a plausible 
constitutive principle concerning c will imply  
[that] according to any genuinely admissible assignment according to which that table 
exists, the table originally came from a quantity of matter overlapping to some 
specified degree with that of m. (Peacocke 1999, p. 196; my emphasis). 
As we saw in §1, the Constitutive Principles include specific principles about particular 
individuals,2 each of which individuates the object it is about, this meaning that it specifies 
the individual essence of this object. [See (Peacocke 1999, p.145) and (Peacocke 2002b, p. 
504)]. For the sake of discussion, we can state the constitutive principle for table c as 
follows3: 
                                                 
2  This is indeed what Peacocke seems to have in mind when, talking about individual essences, he 
gives, as an example of Constitutive Principle, the second one quoted in this work, in §1.1. 
 3  This is a relaxed way of stating the principle, because I am implicitly restricting it to those 
assignments that have c in their domain. Strictly speaking, the principle should say that an 
assignment is inadmissible if it both counts the proposition that c exists as true, and the proposition 
that c comes from a piece of matter overlapping [to a specified degree] with m as false. I have 
chosen the formulation in (1) for expository reasons, but nothing essential depends on it. 
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(1)  An assignment s is admissible only if, according to it, c originates from a quantity of 
matter overlapping to some specified degree with m. 
 
The intuitions that a principle like (1) is trying to accommodate are those according to which 
the very same table could originate in different worlds from slightly different pieces of 
matter. To see why these intuitions do not require the contingency of the Constitutive 
Principles, consider s@; the admissible assignment whose corresponding specification 
exhaustively and correctly describes the actual world. 
Since c is an actual table, c∈Ds@; also, c originates, according to s@, exactly from m. Assume 
that principle (1) above is true according to s@. 
Now let s’ be an assignment such that: c∈Ds’; s’∈val(admissible, s@); and such that c 
originates, according to s’, from m1 (where m1 is different from m, but overlaps enough with 
m for s’ to satisfy (1)).  
[I will use ‘m ≈ m1’ to say that m and m1 overlap enough; and analogues]. 
 
The schema of the situation is as follows: 
 s@ → s’ 
 c = c 
 m ≠ m1 
 m ≈ m1 
 (1)   (1) or (2)? 
 
Our target question is this: Which is the constitutive principle involving c that is true 
according to s’? There are two natural candidates (among the spectrum of possible 
candidates); either (1) from above, or (2): 
(1)  An assignment s is admissible only if, according to it, c originates from a quantity of 
matter overlapping to some specified degree with m. 
(2)  An assignment s is admissible only if, according to it, c originates from a quantity of 
matter overlapping to some specified degree with m1. 
 
Of these, it is only by answering the target question with (2) that we would obtain the 
contingency of the Constitutive Principles (in the current case, the contingency of (1)). But 
trying to accommodate Salmon’s intuitions does not commit us to this answer. More 
importantly, no matter how we answer this question, Salmon’s intuitions are already saved by 
the mere fact of endorsing a principle like (1) as being true in s@.  For, what ensures that c 
may originate from slightly different pieces of matter is the truth of (1), plus the fact that its 
satisfaction conditions do not uniquely determine a state of affairs (like coming from m), but 
the disjunction of a spectrum of them (coming from m, or coming from m1 …). Thus, merely 
by endorsing (1) as being true according to s@, we already allow for some flexibility in the 
origins of c. This is enough for respecting Salmon’s intuitions, and is independent of the 
modal status we give to such a principle.  
 
Anyone who, like Peacocke, leaves open the question of whether the Constitutive Principles 
are contingent by referring to Salmon’s view on flexibility of origins seems to be thinking of 
(2) as the correct answer to our target question above. My claim is that, given that by 
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answering (1) we accommodate flexible intuitions with the fact that the constitutive 
principles remain the same from world to world, Salmon’s examples do not support the 
contingency of the Constitutive Principles. This is to say that flexibility of origins is not 
inconsistent with the claim that individual essences of artefacts are necessary of them; or, in 
Peacocke’s terms, that artefacts are individuated by exactly the same constitutive principles in 
every world in which they exist.  
 
2.2.1 Salmon’s Similar Assumption. 
Re-quoting Peacocke from §2.1, Salmon is one of the “theorists who self-consciously adopt 
constitutive principles which they also hold to be contingent.” One of Salmon’s conclusions 
in his Appendix A of Reference and Essence, namely, the non-transitivity of the accessibility 
relation, also seems to rely on thinking that the answer to the question above is (2), rather 
than (1). His argument for non-transitivity essentially depends on having (implicitly) assumed 
that an entity (a ship in his case) can have different (individual) essences in different 
worlds— an assumption that he seems to consider to be equivalent to that about flexibility of 
origins.  
Recall again assignment s@, where (1) is true, and assume for the sake of the argument that, 
given (1), table c can (relative to s@) originate from any of the following material origins: m-2, 
m-1, m, m1, m2. Now, assignment s’, according to which c originates from m1, would satisfy 
(1), being thereby admissible with respect to s@. The question above about which of (1) or (2) 
is a true constitutive principle about c according to s’, is now the question about whether the 
very same (set of) material origins individuate c, also relative to s’.4 So, the reformulation of 
the target question now runs as follows: What are the possible material origins for c with 
respect to s’? 
(1*) The same as with respect to s@:    m-2, m-1, m, m1, m2. 
(2*) Slightly different:   m-1, m, m1, m2, m3. 
Salmon’s motivation for non-transitivity [See (Salmon 1981, p.238-240)] essentially depends 
on assuming (2*); that is, his argument assumes that, in each world, w, the realized possibility 
of the artefact in question is always at the centre of the range of new possibilities (relative to 
w), and this is why, in a world where c comes from m1, (1*), whose centre is m, cannot be, 
according to this assumption, the correct answer.5 However, we have seen that this 
assumption is not mandatory; (1*) is also a coherent option, which means that we can 
accommodate our flexible intuitions by saying that, no matter what possibility is realized, the 
range of possible origins for c will remain the same in each world; i.e., the same set of 
possible material origins {m-2, m-1, m, m1, m2} individuates c in every world, w, in which c 
exists, independently of which of the five possibilities c realizes in w. 
In Salmon’s case, endorsement of (1*) would preclude any motivation for the non-transitivity 
of the accessibility relation among worlds. In Peacocke’s case (where the range of 
                                                 
 4  Recall that, in Peacocke’s account, constitutive principles provide individuative conditions for 
objects, and play the role of cross-world identification principles. 
 5 Note that, by slightly changing (from world to world) the set of possible material origins, one can 
obtain non-transitivity by giving a chain of worlds the last of which realizes some possibility not 
contemplated by the first. But we cannot do so if we keep fixed the set of possible origins along 
the chain, and this is why assuming (2*) is essential to Salmon’s argument for non-transitivity.  
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possibilities are determined by the corresponding Constitutive Principles), endorsement of (1) 
would preclude any motivation for the contingency of the Constitutive Principles. 
 
With respect to this, and for quite similar reasons, I agree with Williamson that intuitions 
about flexibility of origins do not support the denial of S4; or, in terms of the present 
discussion, the contingency of the Constitutive Principles. As already mentioned, Salmon’s 
conclusion is that the accessibility relation among worlds is not transitive, and against this 
conclusion Williamson rightly claims that “there is no clear need of the specifically modal 
claims invoked by Salmon, Forbes and others”. (Williamson 1990, p. 127) 
 
Although Peacocke does not commit himself to the truth of flexibility of origins, he seems 
nonetheless to be sympathetic to Salmon’s argument against transitivity constructed under 
that assumption. However, if we want the Principle-Based Account to accommodate 
intuitions about flexibility, we have to resist Salmon’s argument because, contrary to what 
Peacocke says, it is not true that nothing guarantees that the Constitutive Principles are 
necessary. The next section argues for this latter claim. 
 
2.3. Addressing Question (ii). 
Inside Peacocke’s account, the only way of consistently accommodating Salmon’s intuitions 
is by introducing flexible-but-necessary Constitutive Principles: ‘Flexible’ in the sense that, 
like (1) above, their satisfaction conditions do not uniquely determine a state of affairs, but a 
set of (close but mutually exclusive) states of affairs, allowing thus for the flexibility of 
origins. That they are necessary, on pain of inconsistency, is, I claim, a consequence of the 
recursivity of MEP. 
 
Let us start by describing a situation that uses the assumption that (2) is the correct answer to 
the target question from §2.2. The situation here is an extension of the previous one and can 
be schematized as follows: 
   s@   → s’ → s’’ ¬(s@→s’’) 
   c  = c = c 
   m ≠ m1 ≠ m3    (m ≠ m3) 
   m ≈ m1 ≈ m3 ¬(m ≈ m3) 
 (1)  (2) 
 
Assignments s@ and s’ are as before, with the addition that we assume now that (2) is true 
according to s’. We are then assuming the contingency of at least one of the Constitutive 
Principles; namely (1). [Since (2) is assumed to be true in s’, and since (1) and (2) are 
mutually exclusive, (1) is assumed to be false in s’.] 
The new assignment s’’ is admissible according to s’; that is, s’’∈val(admissible, s’). It is also 
such that c∈Ds’’, and such that c originates, according to s’’, from a piece of matter, m3, such 
that the following two conditions hold: (a) m3 is different from, but overlaps enough with, m1, 
and, (b) m3 is also different from, and does not overlap enough with, m. By condition (b), s’’ 
violates (1) and thus, s’’∉val(admissible, s@). 
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This is a situation in which it happens with artefacts what Peacocke suggests may happen; 
namely, that “something is possibly possible for the table which is not actually possible for 
it” (Peacocke 1999, p. 196). That is, while it is possibly possible for c to originate from m3, it 
is not (merely) possible. In terms of admissibility of assignments, there is an admissibly 
admissible assignment (s’’) that is not an admissible assignment. This is, however, what 
cannot happen in Peacocke’s proposal. Let us see why. 
 
Ex hypothesi, s’’∈val(admissible, s’). Reasoning from the principle-based account, and 
particularly using the recursivity of MEP, we can obtain its negation, s’’∉val(admissible, s’), 
showing that the described situation is not consistent with the proposal. 
By s’∈val(admissible, s@), s’ satisfies all Principles of Possibility that are actually true. In 
particular, s’ satisfies MEP, and, in virtue of satisfying MEP, s’ determines the extension of 
admissible (here we use the recursivity of MEP) by applying the same rule as is applied in the 
actual world. As applied in the actual world, an assignment s is admissible only if it satisfies 
all Principles of Possibility; in particular, only if it satisfies the constitutive principle (1). 
Thus, an assignment s is admissible according to s’ only if s satisfies (1). Ex hypothesi, 
assignment s’’ violates (1). Thus, s’’ is not admissible according to s’; that is, 
s’’∉val(admissible, s’). 
 
The crucial step in this argument assumes both, that (1) is a constitutive principle, and that it 
partially and invariably constitutes the rule for the concept admissible. In general, the 
argument assumes that MEP and all the Constitutive Principles are listed one by one in the 
rule for admissible and that this list is constitutive of the rule. Granted that, the recursivity of 
MEP ensures that principle (1), like any other principle, will be inherited by any admissible 
assignment, s, as one of the constraints on admissibility imposed by s itself. In the next 
subsection, I will discuss this assumption in some detail. For the moment, we just identify it, 
and use it again to generalize the argument. 
 
Generalizing from this particular case, we may show that all the Constitutive Principles 
remain the same across worlds as a consequence of the recursivity of MEP, which would be 
the first step to conclude that the accessibility relation among worlds is transitive. The key 
idea of a complete proof would run as follows: Consider s@. Consider also s1, and s2, two 
arbitrary assignments such that s2 is admissible according to s1, and s1 is admissible according 
to s@. We want to show that s2 is admissible also according to s@. Since s1 is in the extension 
of admissible according to s@, s1 satisfies the Principles of Possibility that are true according 
to s@. In particular, s1 satisfies the Modal Extension Principle. A consequence of this is that 
the extension of the concept admissible in s1 is determined by applying the same rule as is 
applied in the actual world. That is, an assignment is admissible only if it satisfies each of the 
Principles of Possibility true according to s@. But now, ex hypothesi, s2 belongs to the 
extension of admissible according to s1, which is to say that s2 satisfies the Principles of 
Possibility true according to s@. By the Principle of Constrained Recombination, this is a 
sufficient condition for an assignment to be admissible, and thus, s2 will also be in the 
extension of admissible according to s@. By extrapolating from this particular case, it is 
shown that the relation x is admissible according to y is transitive. By the correlation 
introduced at the end of §1.1, between this relation and the accessibility relation, we conclude 
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that the accessibility relation among worlds (specifications) is also transitive. From here, the 
Principles of Possibility hold under any admissiblyn admissible assignment. 6 
 
2.3.1 The Rule for admissible. 
As advanced in §2.3, the crucial assumption in the arguments above is that (1) is a 
constitutive principle, and that it partially and invariably constitutes the rule for the concept 
admissible. If the arguments given there are to hold, this assumption is need of a justification. 
The focus here will be, first, a direct justification for the assumption, and, second, an 
excursus on alternative proposals on what the rule for admissible may consist of, which will 
provide further support for the assumption.  
Let us start with the direct justification. Note that, according to Peacocke: 
The Modal Extension Principle, when taken together with the other Principles of 
Possibility, fixes a rule for determining the actual extension of the concept admissible. 
(Peacocke 1999, 151; my emphasis) 
Furthermore, we know from §1.1 that the constitutive principles specify individuative 
conditions for the entities at the level of reference; for each such principle, its content 
specifies the individual essence of the particular individual it is about. In general, 
the Constitutive Principle implied by a true statement of the individual essence of a 
particular object amounts simply to a further axiom placing a condition on what has to 
be the case for any given assignment to be admissible. (Peacocke 1999, 147; my 
emphasis) 
From these two quotations, the following seems indisputable. First, the rule for admissible is 
extensionally given; i.e., it consists of a list of principles providing individually necessary and 
jointly sufficient conditions for admissibility. Second, the rule, as applied in the actual world, 
includes information about actual essences of individuals.  
We know from Peacocke that rules are constitutive of concepts in the precise sense that “if the 
semantic value […] were fixed by a different rule than is applied in the actual world, we 
would not really have the same concept any more” (Peacocke, 1999, 153). From here, it is 
also indisputable that the rule for admissible is the same in every world; something 
indispensable when evaluating iterated modalities.  
This all is clear; but to fully justify the assumption, we need to address as well the question of 
whether, without lost of identity, this very same (extensional) rule may be constituted in 
different worlds by (slightly or not so slightly) different lists of principles. More specifically, 
                                                 
6    This is in fact a proof for the claim that the accessibility relation within the generated submodel that 
has s@-specification as its bottom element is transitive, which is enough for my purposes here. 
However, with analogous reasoning we can also show that the accessibility relation within this 
submodel is Euclidean, and, from here, we can motivate the claim that this submodel is in fact the 
original model. That is, that there is no brute possible world outside it. Consider s@, s’, and s’’ 
such that s’∈val(admissible, s@), and s’’∈val(admissible, s@). Since s’ is an admissible 
assignment, by satisfaction and recursivity of MEP, it determines the extension of admissible 
applying the same rule as is applied in the actual world. Thus, an assignment s is admissible 
according to s’ iff s satisfies MEP and the constitutive principles. By s’’∈val(admissible, s@), s’’ is 
such an assignment and thus, s’’∈val(admissible, s’). By analogous reasoning, we also have that 
s’∈val(admissible, s’’). Generalizing this argument, the accessibility relation in this sub-model is 
also Euclidean, which allows us to see informally that this submodel is the original model.  
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for any entity e, the question is whether, without altering the identity of the rule for 
admissible, e’s constitutive principle may vary across worlds in the specific sense of its 
content and e’s realized possibility co-varying in the way illustrated in §2.2.1. In terms of the 
arguments from §2.3, can the very same rule be partially constituted, in s’, by (2) rather than 
(1)?  
My answer to this question is negative, and, at this point, the crucial assumption of the 
arguments from above is reduced to the following assumption (derived from a more general 
assumption on what the identity criterion for rules is): the identity criterion for the rule 
governing admissible is given in terms of its actual list of principles. There are intuitive 
considerations in support of this assumption7, but, in fact, it is rather stronger than a mere 
interpretative assumption. In a book symposium on Being Known, apart from telling us that 
the rule that determines the extension of admissible in the actual world is given by the set of 
principles of possibility, Peacocke tells us as well that these principles “are the rules that 
make the concept of admissibility the concept it is”, from which one should understand that a 
different list would alter the identity of the rule, thereby altering also the identity of the 
concept.8 [See (Peacocke 2001), 110] 
 
Given what the rule is, then, the arguments are in place, and S4 is validated by Peacocke’s 
account. If we wanted to leave non-transitivity as a theoretical possibility, we may of course 
consider alternative ways of thinking about the rule for admissible that would make the 
account compatible with individual essences being contingent and with the non-validation of 
S4. The most salient representatives of these alternatives are (only) sketched below, and a 
more extended comparative evaluation of their pros and cons in relation to the many-fold aim 
of the Principle-Based Account seems necessary. For our present concerns, however, it 
suffices to say that none of them seem to be Peacocke’s intended rule, and that some of them 
raise independent problems for the account. 
 
First alternative: One could retain the claim that the Constitutive Principles partially 
constitute the rule for admissible but deny that statements like (1) or (2) are constitutive 
principles. The constitutive principles, it may be suggested, are not at the bottom level of 
specificity; that is, unlike (1) and (2), they do not de re mention the entities a particular 
individual depends on (like m, or m1). Instead, the constitutive principle for table c would not 
rigidify to actual origins but rather be something along the lines of (c) below, linking, for any 
assignment, s, the specific requirements of the principle to c’s origins according to s:  
                                                 
7  Suppose, to give intuitive support to this idea, that we do allow the same rule for admissible vary 
in content. In each world, what content the rule has would depend on contingent features of the 
world; like, for instance, what exact piece of matter a particular table contingently comes from in 
that world. This strikes me as unsound; extensions are the kind of things that may vary from world 
to world for this reason, but it sounds strange to contend that contents of rules do so as well. 
8  In this book symposium Peacocke states the necessity of all the Principles of Possibility, and 
provides, as an illustration, a proof for the necessity of MEP that suggests that he would be 
sympathetic to the proofs offered here.  Nothing is said there, however, about how to 
accommodate this latter view about the modal status of the Principles of Possibility with the 
contents of Appendix A of Being Known, and, in particular, about the details of the account in 
relation to Salmon’s views, to flexibility of origin and to the validation of S4. 
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(c) An assignment is admissible only if, according to it, c originates from a quantity of 
matter overlapping to a high degree with the piece of matter from which c originates (in 
each case). 
If this notion of constitutive principle is generalized to any entity whatsoever (whether with 
flexible essence or not), reflection reveals that strange results may be obtained by the 
application of the rule.9 In relation to the concerns of the present paper, more important is, 
however, the following. The interest of such a proposal is that it is compatible with (1) being 
contingent; the reason being that (1), in virtue of not being now a Principle of Possibility, 
would not partially constitute the rule for admissible, and thereby it would not be inherited by 
any admissible assignment. The un-felicitousness of this proposal, however, also in relation to 
the concerns of this paper is that, since neither (1) nor (2) would now be Constitutive 
Principles, their modal status is irrelevant to our target question about the modal status of the 
Constitutive Principles. What is now relevant to us is the modal status of claims like (c). And, 
appealing again (in exactly the same way as before) to the recursivity of MEP plus the claim 
that the Constitutive Principles partially constitute the rule for admissible, principles like (c) 
will be necessary.10 The following two reasons, furthermore, give further support to the 
interpretation of the rule that we used in the arguments from §2.3. First, the examples 
provided by Peacocke, as well as the second quotation in this section, strongly suggest that he 
intends the constitutive principles to be at the bottom level of specificity. Second, if Peacocke 
intended things like (c), rather than (1), to be constitutive principles, changes across worlds in 
c’s origins would trivially require no corresponding change at all in (the content of) c’s 
constitutive principle. From here, the point in §2.2 about Question (i) would be immediate, 
and it would make it hard to explain why Peacocke focuses on issues about flexibility of 
origins in discussing the modal status of the constitutive principles. From the fact that he 
suggests that flexibility of origins may support the contingency of the constitutive principles, 
one should understand that constitutive principles are indeed at the bottom level of specificity.  
 
Second alternative: One may retain the claim that (1) is a constitutive principle, but deny 
instead that it partially constitutes the rule for admissible. Two sub-cases must be 
distinguished here. On one version, only Constitutive Principles with certain generality (like 
                                                 
9  In the first place, it can be shown that satisfaction of MEP would be sufficient for reflexive 
admissibility, whereas it seems natural to expect that, on the Principle-Based Account, there will 
be assignments that, while satisfying MEP, and in virtue of this, will count themselves as 
inadmissible by behaving (inadmissibly) strangely at the level of reference. Second, things like (c) 
do not seem to provide individuative conditions in an absolute sense. Rather, they provide only a 
way for, in conjunction with knowledge of what is the case according to a given assignment, 
knowing which condition individuates a particular individual at that assignment. This condition, 
however, will not be absolutely individuative because it will individuate different individuals at 
other assignments (this is easy to see by playing with chains of worlds). 
10  Note, en passant, that, on this view, a proof establishing the necessity of all the Principles of 
Possibility would be insufficient as a proof for the validation of S4; in particular, if there are 
indeed entities with flexible essences, we would lose S4 but retain the necessity of all the 
principles. 
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(c), and unlike (1) or (2)) partially constitute the rule. On a second version, none of the 
Constitutive Principles partially constitutes the rule. Again, they are open alternatives, but 
both sub-cases go against Peacocke’s claim that the MEP, together with the other principles 
of possibility, fixes the rule for admissible, which strongly suggest that all Principles of 
Possibility, and not only some of them, are listed one by one in the rule that fixes this 
concept.  
 
Finally, one may want to say that the rule for admissible, rather than being extensionally 
given by the list of principles, is intensional in character. On this view, the rule would read as 
something along the lines of:  
An assignment is admissible only if it satisfies all Principles of Possibility that are true 
(whatever they are in each case). 
Again, this is a theoretical option, but, first, we have already enough evidence to see that it 
does not seem to be what Peacocke intended, and, second, it is in fact something Peacocke 
should not want. Under this interpretation, the recursivity of MEP needs an argument. If the 
rule is not extensionally specified, it is compatible with any principle, MEP included, being 
contingent. From here, such a rule would not guarantee that MEP is projected as one of the 
constraints on admissibility imposed by any admissible assignment. While this is a 
possibility, the way Peacocke argues for the necessity of MEP clearly rules it out as his 
option, and supports instead the extensional interpretation favoured here. 
 
2.4. What Kind of Account are We Left With? 
After this excursus focused on the rule for admissible, we may say that, given what the rule 
is, the arguments in §§2.1-2.2 show that there is no object individuated by different principles 
in different worlds. Now, if we endorse flexibility of origins we may easily be led to hold that, 
at the same space-time region, there is a plurality of artefacts constituted by the same piece of 
matter m. In the example above, we probably need to say that there is a spectrum of tables. 
For instance, apart from table c, there would be another table, c1, individuated at all worlds by 
the following constitutive principle: 
(3) An assignment is admissible only if, according to it, c1 originates from a piece of matter 
overlapping to some specified degree with m1. 
Both, c1 and c, would (fully) coincide in the actual world constituted by m, and would (fully) 
coincide in s’ constituted by m1.  
The reason for this (rational) commitment is as follows. Flexibility of origins tells us that the 
very same entity can originate from slightly different pieces of matter. We are (simplifiedly) 
assuming that the following set of possible origins {m-2, m-1, m, m1, m2} individuates c in s@.  
Now, the set {m-1, m, m1, m2, m3} is formally equivalent to the previous one. Among all 
formally equivalent sets we can, if we want, make ad hoc distinctions between those that 
individuate tables from those that do not. However, if we do not want to make such ad hoc 
distinctions, we should claim that all-of-them-if-any individuate some table. By doing so, 
then, principle (3) is also, in s@, a constitutive principle, and we are denoting by ‘c1’ the entity 
individuated by it.11 
                                                 
11  For a detailed discussion on this, see [Williamson, 1990]. 
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The intersection of these two sets has four elements. Constitutive Principles are playing the 
role of cross-world identification principles, and this is to say that any possible origin in that 
intersection is a sufficient condition for the existence of both c and c1, which implies the 
existence of coincident artefacts. Stated briefly, to avoid ad hoc distinctions, flexibility of 
origin rationally leads us to the view that the same origin simultaneously gives rise to 
different entities (only slightly different in their essences). 
The fact that, given flexibility of origin, we have to choose between ad hoc distinctions or 
coincidents is probably an unwelcome consequence.  Be this as it may, the focus here is that 
this thesis is compatible both with Salmon’s intuitions and with the claim that there is no 
artefact that satisfies different constitutive principles at different worlds.12 
 
Concluding Remarks 
If we retain the recursivity of MEP, and retain also the rule for admissible as it is, there seems 
to be no alternative consistent option: all Principles of Possibility are necessary. It has been 
stressed, however, that the necessity of the Constitutive Principles is not incompatible with 
our intuitions (whenever we have them) about the flexibility of origins of artefacts. Probably, 
though, none of the alternative ways of accommodating those intuitions from the Principle-
Based Account are fully satisfactory (either because of the commitment to coincident entities 
or because of ad hoc distinctions between formally equivalent properties). This problem, 
however, is not specific to what Peacocke’s proposal is. Rather, it is characteristic of any 
approach that tries to accommodate intuitions about flexibility of origins plus a desire (or 
requirement, like in Peacocke’s case) to validate S4. As far as Peacocke’s approach is 
concerned, we have seen that once the necessity of the Principles of Possibility is 
acknowledged, the account still has plenty of possibilities regarding Origin Essentialism. It 
can be made compatible with flexible origins, or (if neither version of it is satisfactory) it 
could also be made compatible with Strong Origin Essentialism. 
I cannot expand here on consideration about the debate between the weak and the strong 
versions of Origin Essentialism (respectively, the one allowing for slight variations, and the 
inflexible one). Let me finish, however, with the following suggestion. To start with Weak 
Origin Essentialism as a premise easily leads us to approaches that probably require the 
denial of intuitions which are stronger than the very intuitions about flexibility of origins. For 
                                                 
12    Inspiration for how we could endorse the necessity of the constitutive principles (or of 
individuative essences, in Salmon’s terms) without endorsing the multiplicity of entities of the 
same kind, fully sharing the spatio-temporal region, may be found in (Williamson 1990, p. 126-
143). I suspect, however, that his way of resisting the undesirable multiplicity of entities like tables 
(by means of a supervaluationist strategy) would not be fully satisfactory to those who are equally 
uncomfortable with the existence of a plurality of what we may call ‘artefacts*’, a consequence in 
any case of Williamson’s treatment, and the only way of escaping coincidence at the level of 
artefacts. If Williamson’s treatment (radically different from the one he offers in the vagueness 
case) is still (ontologically) unsatisfactory, there are two serious alternatives: either we make the 
ad hoc distinctions mentioned in the main text, or we revise the intuitive advantage that weak 
origin essentialism (the one allowing for slight variation) has traditionally enjoyed over its strong 
version. 
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instance, a Principle-Based Account plus Weak Origin Essentialism easily denies intuitions 
about the non-existence of coincidents, whereas an approach like Salmon’s would sacrifice 
intuitions about the non-variability of the individual essence of an object across worlds. This 
debate needs careful examination, and the considerations that have emerged here might give 
us reasons to reconsider our (in general non-favourable) attitude towards Strong Origin 
Essentialism. The aim of this paper, however, has not been to contribute to this debate. The 
conclusion of the present work that is most closely related to it is that Peacocke’s account is 
able to accommodate both the Weak and the Strong versions of Origin Essentialism, as long 
as the way of doing so does not require the contingency of even one of its Principles of 
Possibility. 
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